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Abstract
Purpose
- The information security field experiences a continuous stream of information security 
incidents and breaches, which are publicised by the media, public bodies and regulators.  
Despite the need for information security practices being recognised and in existence for some 
time the underlying general information security affecting tasks and causes of these incidents 
and breaches are not consistently understood, particularly with regard to human error.  
Methodology
- This paper analyses recent published incidents and breaches to establish the proportions of 
human error, and where possible subsequently utilises the HEART human reliability analysis 
technique, which is established within the safety field.  
Findings
- This analysis provides an understanding of the proportions of incidents and breaches that 
relate to human error as well as the common types of tasks that result in these incidents and 
breaches through adoption of methods applied within the safety field. 
Originality
- This research provides original contribution to knowledge through the analysis of recent 
public sector information security incidents and breaches in order to understand the 
proportions that relate to human error.   
Keywords
Information security, incidents, breaches, human error, HEART, GISAT
1. Introduction
Our previous work (Evans, He, Yevseyeva, et al., 2018) analysed data breach trends published 
in 2017 that were reported to the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (Information 
Commissioner’s Office, 2018) and identified  that a number of UK sectors have experienced 
significant increases in reported information security incidents in Q4 2017.  In some sectors 
such as the health sector this is primarily due to incidents that relate to people and human 
error.  Despite this, the information security community does not have a thorough 
understanding of what constitutes a human error and often resorts to general basic awareness 
or training on information security following an incident rather than dealing with the causal 
factors (Mahfuth et al., 2017).  Current practices fall regularly short of identifying the actual 
root cause of human error related information security incidents even though people are 
recognized as being the weakest link in information security controls (Metalidou et al., 2014; 
Halevi et al., 2017; Mahfuth et al., 2017; Parsons et al., 2017; Furnell et al., 2018).  There are 
also no established human error information security frameworks in practice to enable not only 
effective resolution of human error related information security incidents but also the 
prevention of these events.  
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The aim and motivation for this research is to analyse and establish the volumes and causes of 
information security incidents and breaches, published by the Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO) and the UK National Health Service (NHS), that relate to human error for the 
periods of Q1 and Q2 2018.  Where sufficient data has been published, incidents are mapped 
to the established Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) human 
reliability analysis method, which is widely utilised within the safety field, to understand the 
types and context of tasks which are associated with the published incidents and breaches.
This research provides original contribution to knowledge through the analysis of recent 
public sector information security incidents in order to understand the proportions that relate 
to human error as well as the common generic task types (GTT), as defined within the 
HEART (Williams, 1992) technique, and general information security affecting tasks (GISAT) 
(Evans, Maglaras, et al., 2018) that lead to these events. The research also supports the 
applicability of the HEART human reliability analysis technique within the information 
security field.
The remainder of paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents related research into the 
human factor of information security.  Section 3 provides an overview of the method applied 
for the research into published information security incidents and breaches and section 4 
presents the results of the research.  Section 5 delivers the key findings and section 6 
concludes the research and outlines future work.
2. Related Work
There have been many research articles published on the topic of information security but 
proportionally very few articles dedicated to the human factor and specifically human error.  
In our previous research (Evans et al., 2016) we emphasised this gap in current research and 
also emphasised the need for empirical research into human error effects on information 
security assurance to understand the underlying causes of human error.  Human error is 
defined as non-deliberate, unintentional or accidental cause of poor information security 
(Werlinger, Hawkey and Beznosov, 2009).  Amongst published articles human error is 
identified as being associated with a large proportion of information security incidents or 
breaches (Komatsu, Takagi and Takemura, 2013; Stewart and Jürjens, 2017) and the most 
critical factor in the management of information security (Stewart and Jürjens, 2017).  
Literature has consistently presented that effective information security management must 
essentially embrace the human factor in addition to technology (Werlinger, Hawkey and 
Beznosov, 2009; Asai and Hakizabera, 2010; Frangopoulos, Eloff and Venter, 2014; Stewart 
and Jürjens, 2017, Hadlington et al 2019) and that the security of IT systems and platforms 
have been undermined by human failings (Lacey, 2010).
It is widely accepted that security incidents related to human perpetrators from internal sources 
are the most difficult to prevent (Hwang et al., 2017) and not an easy task (McLeod and 
Dolezel, 2018).  A fundamental challenge in complex sociotechnical systems is that of relying 
upon humans to achieve reliable operations (Kyriakidis et al., 2018) and it is difficult to 
integrate the human factor in to a plan-do-check-act cycle of an effective Information Security 
Management System (ISMS) (Frangopoulos, Eloff and Venter, 2014).  Addressing these 
difficulties requires new interventions to change human awareness, attitudes and behaviour 
(Lacey, 2010).  To this point, Stewart (Stewart and Jürjens, 2017) presented in his work that 
human issues were the main issues of the bank he was engaged with.  Incidents where 
organisational insiders disclose sensitive information can have a severe impact on an 
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organisation and are challenging to understand and implement effective controls (Choi, 
Martins and Bernik, 2018) due to the complexity of human behaviour (Nguyen et al., 2018).                    
Human error quantification has varied in published literature.  Frangopoulos et al (Komatsu, 
Takagi and Takemura, 2013) presented that 42 percent of security incidents resulted from 
human error whereas Stewart (Stewart and Jürjens, 2017) stated that 65 percent were due to 
some forms of human error.  Alavi et al (Alavi, Islam and Mouratidis, 2016) presented 
research, which found that 64 percent of security incidents were directly related to human 
error.  Whereas Asai and Hakizabera (Asai and Hakizabera, 2010) stated in their research that 
80 percent of information security breaches are caused by human error.  The information 
security field should study methods used within the safety field (Lacey, 2010), where it was 
found that 90 percent of accidents were caused by human failure. It was also suggested that 
new interventions are required to change human behaviour (Lacey, 2010) and that few 
information security practitioners have an understanding of proven methodologies for 
changing human behaviour.  It was also stated that factors such as stress, lack of training or 
supervision, and bad system or process design are the underlying causes of breaches (Lacey, 
2010) and also that information security management remains relatively weak in conducting 
root cause analysis of minor incidents. 
The information security risk management approach is useful for maintaining acceptable risk 
levels, but they are not developed to solve complex socio-technical problems (Wangen et al., 
2017).  In fact despite it being recognised that the actions and behaviour of organisational 
insiders are essential to achieve information security success, the human factor is often 
overlooked (Choi, Martins and Bernik, 2018).  Methods and techniques to perform root cause 
analysis and risk assessment to identify the factors that enable the early detection of danger 
exist and have been shown to give reliable results even when highly complex human factors 
aspects are involved (Cacciabue and Vella, 2010).  It has been published that insights from 
root cause analysis are not likely to inform practice or process improvements and it is 
suggested that there is more human factors and independence undertaken as part of 
investigations (Hibbert et al., 2018) as long as standardised and explicit processes and 
techniques are used (National Patient Safety Foundation, 2015).  Mayer, Kunz, and Volkamer 
(Mayer, Kunz and Volkamer, 2017) stated that there are a low number of studies investigating 
behavioural factors of information security and that further literature would be a valuable 
addition.  According to Williams (Williams, 2015) one of the last remaining hurdles to be 
overcome in the design of safe, reliable systems is the human being as recognised by safety 
and reliability engineers.  Lacey (Lacey, 2010) suggests that Security Managers could benefit 
from studying the lessons learned in the safety field and He and Johnson (He and Johnson, 
2015) presented in their research that the reoccurrence of past security incidents in healthcare 
showed that lessons had not been learned across healthcare organisations.  With regard to risk 
analysis performed within IT security and the safety field the only main difference is the 
terminology so it is suggested that IT security is treated the same as systematic failures in the 
safety field (Braband and Schäbe, 2016).
The healthcare sector continues to be affected by the largest percentage of data breaches (He 
and Johnson, 2015) with almost two breaches per day being recorded in 2015, which is ten 
times the volume reported in 2009 presenting a position whereby preventing healthcare 
breaches is very difficult (McLeod and Dolezel, 2018).  The reporting of incidents is core 
requirement for UK National Health Service (NHS) organisations (Rooksby, Gerry and Smith, 
2007).  Healthcare breaches have the potential to result in theft, modification or misuse of 
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personal data and healthcare organisations. Processing personal data for health purposes have 
a legal and moral duty to proactively understand the causes of data breaches as they remain 
vulnerable to a wide range of threats including human issues (McLeod and Dolezel, 2018). 
3. Method
The method employed by this research was to understand the proportions of human error 
related incidents from published public sector incidents and personal data breaches by the UK 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) and the UK National Health Service (NHS).  As 
there is greater incident detail published for the NHS personal data breaches we were able to 
use a set of GISATs to map the breaches to, in order to provide a richer level of understanding 
regarding the specific tasks that were being performed when the incident occurred.  Once the 
GISATs were established we were subsequently able to map the breaches to the HEART 
GTTs.
HEART was initially published in 1985 and used by numerous organisations and sectors as a 
mechanism to address the issue of human reliability (Williams, 1992).  HEART has been 
widely used in industry, primarily the nuclear industry (Lyons et al., 2004; Chandler et al., 
2006).  A detailed HEART user manual (Williams, 1992) was written in 1992 for Nuclear 
Electric plc, now EDF Energy.  The HEART method comprises of a set of 9 GTTs as shown 
in Table 1 with associated nominal human unreliability and upper bounds and also 38 error 
producing conditions (EPC) and their accompanying strength values.  The GTTs are a core 
component of the HEART technique which looks to match the task under consideration with a 
predefined list of task descriptions.
A Totally unfamiliar task, performed at speed with no real idea of the likely consequences of actions taken.
B Shift or restore system to a new or original state at a single attempt without supervision or procedures.
C Complex task requiring a high level of understanding and skill.
D Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given insufficient or inadequate attention.
E Routine, highly-practiced, rapid task involving relatively low level of skill.
F Restore or shift a system to original or new state following procedures, with some checking.
G
Completely familiar, well designed, highly practiced routine task occurring 
several times per hour, performed to highest possible standards by highly 
motivated, highly trained and experienced persons, totally aware of implications 
of failure, with time to correct potential error, but without the benefit of 
significant job aids.
H Respond correctly to system command even when there is an assisting or automated supervisory system providing accurate interpretation of system state.
M Miscellaneous task for which no description can be found.
Table 1 – HEART GTTs (Williams, 1992)
The Q1 and Q2 2018 incident trends published by the ICO (Information Commissioner’s 
Office, 2018) were analysed to ascertain a greater degree of understanding of the proportions 
of human error related information security incidents.  In addition to analysis of the ICO data, 
security trend analysis was also performed on the published NHS serious incidents requiring 
investigation (SIRI) level 2 incidents relating to Q1 and Q2 (NHS Digital, 2018).  Further 
analysis of the incidents was conducted by mapping each of the human error related SIRI level 
2 incidents to a set of General Information Security Affecting Tasks (GISAT), which 
Page 4 of 18Information and Computer Security
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Inform
ation and Com
puter Security
subsequently enabled the mapping to the HEART GTTs.  The GISATs were developed during 
our wider research and empirical feasibility study into 12 months of reported information 
security incidents within public and private sector organisations  (Evans, He, Maglaras, et al., 
2018; Evans, Maglaras, et al., 2018).  
The primary focus of this research was public sector incidents and breaches but also undertook 
analysis of combined data for all sectors, including private sector, to enable a holistic set of 
results.  In order to enable the analysis to be performed and establish which incidents were 
likely, possibly or unlikely related to human error, we developed a mapping based upon the 
analysis of the published incidents and experience gained through associated empirical 
research (Evans, He, Maglaras, et al., 2018; Evans, Maglaras, et al., 2018). These mappings 
required updating following our previous publication (Evans, He, Yevseyeva, et al., 2018) as 
the ICO incident/breach types were changed at source (Information Commissioner’s Office, 
2018) which is presented below.  The ICO has replaced the initial incident/breach types and 
created new ones that are higher-level in terms of information security, such as disclosure of 
data, and also cover specific data protection elements such as the right to prevent processing.  
Our mapping update pertained to the adding of the new ICO incident/breach type, mapping to 
the previous ICO incident/breach type and capturing the new human error likelihood.  This 
modification enabled comparisons with previous results (Evans, He, Yevseyeva, et al., 2018) 
to be undertaken to establish if the results were consistent in terms of the proportions of 
human error.  In addition we also mapped the new ICO incident/breach types to the principles 
of confidentiality, integrity and availability as outlined within the ISO27001 standard (The 
British Standards Institution, 2013). 
New ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type C
on
fid
en
tia
lit
y
In
te
gr
ity
A
va
ila
bi
lit
y
Human 
Error 
Likelihood
Previous ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type 
(Information 
Commissioner’s 
Office, 2018)
Previous ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type 
Human Error 
Likelihood 
(Evans, He, 
Yevseyeva, et 
al., 2018) Rationale
Data posted/ 
faxed to 
incorrect 
recipient
Likely The data would 
likely be posted 
or faxed to the 
wrong recipient 
unintentionally
Data sent by 
email to 
incorrect 
recipient
Likely The data would 
likely be 
emailed to the 
wrong recipient 
unintentionally
Failure to use 
bcc when 
sending email
Likely The failure to 
use bcc would 
likely be 
unintentional  
Disclosure of 
data
Y Likely
Verbal 
disclosure
Likely The data would 
likely be 
disclosed by a 
person 
unintentionally
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New ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type C
on
fid
en
tia
lit
y
In
te
gr
ity
A
va
ila
bi
lit
y
Human 
Error 
Likelihood
Previous ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type 
(Information 
Commissioner’s 
Office, 2018)
Previous ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type 
Human Error 
Likelihood 
(Evans, He, 
Yevseyeva, et 
al., 2018) Rationale
Excessive / 
Irrelevant data
Y Y Likely Failure to redact 
data
Likely The data would 
likely be 
redacted 
unintentionally 
Fair 
processing 
info not 
provided
Y Y Possibly n/a n/a The failure to 
provide fair 
processing info 
could be 
organisational or 
possibly human 
error 
Inaccurate 
data
Y Likely n/a n/a The inaccurate 
data would 
likely be 
captured or 
edited 
unintentionally
Obtaining 
data
Y Possibly n/a n/a The non-
compliant 
obtaining of 
data could be 
organisational or 
possibly human 
error
Retention of 
data
Y Possibly n/a n/a The non-
compliant 
retention of data 
could be 
organisational or 
possibly human 
error
S170 Y Unlikely n/a n/a The unlawful 
obtaining of 
data, where the 
victim is likely 
to be the data 
controller, is 
unlikely to be 
unintentional 
human error. 
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New ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type C
on
fid
en
tia
lit
y
In
te
gr
ity
A
va
ila
bi
lit
y
Human 
Error 
Likelihood
Previous ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type 
(Information 
Commissioner’s 
Office, 2018)
Previous ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type 
Human Error 
Likelihood 
(Evans, He, 
Yevseyeva, et 
al., 2018) Rationale
Right to 
prevent 
processing
Y Unlikely n/a n/a The right to 
prevent 
processing is 
likely to be an 
organisational 
non-compliance 
rather than 
human error.
Data left in 
insecure 
location
Likely The data would 
likely be left by 
a person 
unintentionally
Insecure 
disposal of 
hardware
Possibly The insecure 
disposal of 
hardware could 
be technical, 
procedural or 
possibly human 
error
Insecure 
disposal of 
paperwork
Possibly The insecure 
disposal of 
paperwork could 
be technical, 
procedural or 
possibly human 
error
Security Y Y Y Possibly
Loss/theft of 
only copy of 
encrypted data
Possibly The category 
covers both loss 
of equipment 
,which is likely 
to be 
unintentional 
human error, but 
also mainly theft 
of equipment 
which is 
unlikely to be 
human error
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New ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type C
on
fid
en
tia
lit
y
In
te
gr
ity
A
va
ila
bi
lit
y
Human 
Error 
Likelihood
Previous ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type 
(Information 
Commissioner’s 
Office, 2018)
Previous ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type 
Human Error 
Likelihood 
(Evans, He, 
Yevseyeva, et 
al., 2018) Rationale
Loss/theft of 
paperwork
Likely The category 
covers both 
mainly loss of 
paperwork 
which is likely 
to be 
unintentional 
human error but 
also infrequent 
theft of 
paperwork 
which is 
unlikely to be 
human error
Loss/theft of 
unencrypted 
device
Possibly The category 
covers both loss 
of equipment, 
which is likely 
to be 
unintentional 
human error, but 
also mainly theft 
of equipment 
which is 
unlikely to be 
human error
Other principle 
7 failure
Possibly This is a broad 
category and 
incidents could 
possibly be as a 
result of 
unintentional 
human error
Subject access Y Y Y Possibly n/a n/a The failure to 
process a 
subject access 
request in a 
ompliant 
manner could 
possibly be 
human error 
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New ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type C
on
fid
en
tia
lit
y
In
te
gr
ity
A
va
ila
bi
lit
y
Human 
Error 
Likelihood
Previous ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type 
(Information 
Commissioner’s 
Office, 2018)
Previous ICO 
Incident / 
Breach Type 
Human Error 
Likelihood 
(Evans, He, 
Yevseyeva, et 
al., 2018) Rationale
Unable to 
identify
Y Y Y Possibly n/a n/a This is a broad 
category which 
could possibly 
be as a result of 
human error
Use of data Y Y Y Possibly n/a n/a The use of data 
in a non-
compliant 
manner could be 
organisational or 
possibly human 
error
Not specified Y Y Y Possibly n/a n/a This is a broad 
category which 
could possibly 
be as a result of 
human error
Table 2 – Mapping of ICO data security incident categories to human error likelihood
This study analysed 7202 incidents published by the ICO (Information Commissioner’s 
Office, 2018) and 60 NHS SIRI incidents (NHS Digital, 2018).  The development of the 
mapping between incident/breach types and the human error likelihood as shown in Table 2 
was established by the authors of this paper based upon professional experience and the 
completion of feasibility studies which form part of the wider research programme (Evans, He, 
Maglaras, et al., 2018; Evans, Maglaras, et al., 2018).  The mapping of the ICO data was 
undertaken by aligning each of the ICO incident/breach type to a likelihood.  The analysis of 
the NHS data, which contained basic details of each incident, was undertaken by initially 
establishing if human error was a reason for the incident occurring or not, mapping each 
incident to a GISAT and subsequently mapping to a HEART GTT to establish the most 
common tasks associated with the incidents. We were unable to map the ICO incident/breach 
types to the HEART GTTs as the ICO data only provided volumes for each category with no 
specific information for each incident.
4. Results
The results of the analysis of the published public sector (Central and Local Government and 
Health) personal data breaches and NHS SIRI level 2 incidents are presented in the tables and 
figures below.  
The analysis of 7202 published personal data breaches by the ICO for all sectors can be shown 
in Table 3 and Figure 1.  It was established that 64% of the incidents were likely to be as a 
result of human error and that a further 35% could possibly be as a result of human error.  
Therefore, combining both categories provides a view that 97% of all personal data breaches 
reported to the ICO could have been as a result of human error.
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All Sectors
Human 
Error 
Likelihood
Count Percentage
Likely 4641 64.44
Possibly 2531 35.14
Unlikely 30 0.41
Table 3 – Human error likelihood of ICO 
data security incident trends for all sectors
Figure 1 – Likelihood of human error ICO 
data security incident trends for all sectors
The analysis was also performed on specific central government (Table 4 and Figure 2), local 
government (Table 5 and Figure 3) and health sectors (Table 6 and Figure 4).  The analysis 
found that incidents were likely to relate to human error for these three sectors between 67% 
and 77%.  However, taking into account the possible human errors the percentages increased 
significantly. This accumulation found that data security incidents relating to human error was 
possibly 99% for central government, local government and health sectors.
Central Government Sector
Human 
Error 
Likelihood
Count Percentage
Likely 95 67.37
Possibly 45 31.91
Unlikely 1 0.71
Table 4 – Human error likelihood of ICO data 
security incident trends for central government
Figure 2 – Likelihood of human error ICO 
data security incident trends for central 
government
           Local Government Sector
Human 
Error 
Likelihood
Count Percentage
Likely 433 76.91
Possibly 127 22.55
Unlikely 3 0.53
Table 5 – Human error likelihood of ICO data 
security incident trends for local government
Figure 3 – Likelihood of human error ICO 
data security incident trends for local 
government
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Health Sector
Human Error 
Likelihood Count Percentage
Likely 887 68.44
Possibly 404 31.17
Unlikely 5 0.38
Table 6 – Human error likelihood of ICO data 
security incident trends for health
Figure 4 – Likelihood of human error ICO 
data security incident trends for health
Each of the reported NHS SIRI incidents and associated details were analysed and it was 
identified that 40 (67%) of the most serious NHS personal data security incidents pertained to 
human error.  
SIRI Level 2 Incidents
Human 
Error Count Percentage
Yes 40 67
No 20 33
Table 7 – NHS SIRI level 2 incidents Figure 5 – Proportion of human error for 
NHS SIRI 2 incidents
In addition, 883 of the 1296 incidents related to disclosure of data which mapped to the 
confidentiality principle indicating that this is the most impacted principle with regard to 
human error related incidents. 
This analysis of the Q1 and Q2 2018 NHS SIRI level 2 incidents found that 11 (28%) were 
posting an item or information, 11 (28%) were safeguarding information or equipment, and 8 
(20%) were sending an email.  We were able to manually map each incident to the list of 
GISATs using the rich details published for each incident by the NHS.  The details of this 
granular analysis and mapping to GISATs can be seen in Table 8 and Figure 6.
General Information Security 
Affecting Tasks (GISAT) Count
Percentage of human 
error incidents
HEART 
GTT
GISAT1- Sending an email 8 20 G
GISAT2 - Entering, updating or 
deleting data within a system, file or 
document
5 13 D
GISAT3 - Posting an item or 
information 11 28 E
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General Information Security 
Affecting Tasks (GISAT) Count
Percentage of human 
error incidents
HEART 
GTT
GISAT4 - Configuring a system 1 3 B
GISAT5 - Administering a system 0 0 D
GISAT6 - Scanning a document 0 0 D
GISAT7 - Printing a document 1 3 D
GISAT8 - Providing information 
verbally 0 0 G
GISAT9 - Delivering information or 
equipment 1 3 G
GISAT10 - Filing or sorting 
information 0 0 G
GISAT11 - Reading or checking an 
email, file, document or item 0 0 G
GISAT12 - Safeguarding information or 
equipment 11 28 G
GISAT13 – Destroying information or 
equipment 0 0 D
GISAT14 – Accessing a location or 
environment 0 0 G
GISAT15 - Faxing information 0 0 D
GISAT16 - Sharing or handing over 
information or equipment in person 2 5 G
Table 8 - Mapping of NHS SIRI 2 incidents to GISATs and association with HEART GTTs
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Figure 6 - Mapping of NHS SIRI 2 incidents to GISATs
Once the NHS SIRI level 2 incidents had been mapped to the GISATs it was possible to create 
a conceptual mapping to the HEART GTTs.  The mapping can be seen in Table 8.  In addition 
the volumes of each selected GTTs that have been mapped to the Q1 and Q2 2018 SIRI level 2 
incidents can be seen below.  It was established that none of the published incidents were able 
to be mapped to GTTs A, C, E, F, H or M.
GTT Count Percentage
B 1 2.5
D 6 15
E 11 27.5
G 22 55
Table 9 – HEART GTT mapping to 
NHS SIRI level 2 incidents
Figure 7 – HEART GTT mapping to 
NHS SIRI level 2 incidents
In addition, 100% (40) of the human error-related incidents mapped to the confidentiality 
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principle again indicating that this is the most impacted principle with regard to human error 
related incidents. 23 of the 40 human error-related incidents also mapped to the availability 
principle and 8 incidents were able to be mapped to the integrity principle. 
5. Discussion
Following analysis of the published ICO data it was identified that 64% of reported incidents 
across all sectors were likely to be the result of human error, which aligns to the research 
published by (Alavi, Islam and Mouratidis, 2016; Stewart and Jürjens, 2017) and matches our 
analysis undertaken on 2017 data (Evans, He, Yevseyeva, et al., 2018).  In addition a further 
35% could also possibly be as a result of human error.  Therefore, the analysis found that 99% 
of data secur ty incidents reported to the ICO could possibly have been as a result of human 
error suggesting actual rates of human error related information security incidents is higher 
than currently understood by the information security community. These high volumes of 
possible human error information security incidents align to the proportions of human failure 
that led to accidents in the safety field (Lacey, 2010).  This supports the view that the 
established root cause methods utilised within the safety field would demonstrate a higher 
proportion of human error behind current information security incident and breach events than 
currently recognised. 
Each of the 60 reported NHS SIRI level 2 incidents and associated details were analysed and it 
was identified that 40 (67%) of the most serious NHS personal data security incidents 
pertained to human error which again aligns to published research (Alavi, Islam and 
Mouratidis, 2016).  
Following analysis of the published NHS SIRI level 2 incidents it was identified that the most 
common general information security affecting tasks were postage of information and 
safeguarding of information or equipment.  They were followed by the use of email showing 
that focus should be applied to external sharing and communication of information.  The 
analysis of the same incidents against the HEART GTTs found that the most common generic 
task type associated with information security incidents is a completely familiar routine task. 
Analysis of both NHS and ICO data showed that the confidentiality principle was the most 
common principle for all human error-related information security incidents compared to 
integrity or availability.    
6. Conclusions and Future Work
In conclusion, it has been identified that the actual volumes of personal data breaches and 
information security incidents are greater than currently understood by the information 
security community.  Therefore, in order to reduce the volumes of breaches and incidents the 
information security field should understand the human reliability analysis techniques applied 
within the safety field.  The application, and adaptation, of methods used within the safety 
field will enable the underlying root causes of human error to be understood and acted upon, 
which will reduce future volumes of information security incidents and breaches.  In addition, 
organisations should focus on routine operational tasks performed by employees that involve 
the external sharing or communication of confidential or personal data.
The results of this work supports our previous analysis of 2017 data (Evans, He, Yevseyeva, et 
al., 2018) and feasibility studies (Evans, He, Maglaras, et al., 2018; Evans, Maglaras, et al., 
2018) showing a consistent view with regard to the proportions of information security 
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incidents and breaches caused by human error.  This research provides original contribution to 
knowledge through the analysis of recent, Q1 and Q2 2018, information security incidents and 
breaches in addition to our previous similar study of ICO and NHS incidents that were 
published (Evans, He, Yevseyeva, et al., 2018).  This study clearly provides an understanding 
of the proportions of incidents that relate to human error and confirms previously obtained 
results.  In addition, it demonstrates the most common generic task types (GTT), as defined 
within the HEART (Williams, 1992) technique, and general information security affecting 
tasks (GISAT) (Evans, Maglaras, et al., 2018) that lead to these incidents/breaches. The 
research also reinforces both the need and applicability of human reliability analysis 
techniques such as IS-CHEC (Evans, He, Maglaras, et al., 2018) to be utilised within the 
information security field in order to address the most common incident types and reduce their 
current volumes.
We will be continuing our research into the feasibility of human reliability analysis within the 
information security field including publishing associated 12 months real-time incident 
studies, which have been undertaken within public and private sector organisations.  In 
addition, HEART will be subject to further adaptation to produce an empirically validated 
Information Security Core Human Error Causes (IS-CHEC) product, which will be developed 
as a key element of the ongoing action research.
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